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1    IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
     
STATE OF UTAH
     
___________________________________________________________________
 
SALON TROPICANA MIDVALE, Inc. :   
a Utah Corp. : BRIEF OF APPELLANT
:
     Plaintiff/Appellant,                                    :
:
vs.                                                                    :  
                              :
MIDVALE CITY Corp.,             :    
a Municipal corp.                                            : Case No. 20090057-CA
                                                                         : 
     Defendant/Appellee.                                  :
___________________________________________________________________
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(4).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.  Defendant Midvale City improperly revoked Plaintiff’s Conditional Use
Permit without a proper proceeding in which Plaintiff’s rights to Due Process of Law
were respected.
This issue was preserved for appeal by Plaintiff's Motion for summary
2Judgment (R 135-187) and, as a question of statutory construction, is reviewed for
correctness, giving no particular deference to the Trial Court’s decision. See Berube
v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989).
2.  The decisions of the City Planning Commission and City Council to revoke
the Conditional Use Permit were arbitrary and capricious and are not supported by
substantial evidence.  Factual findings will be upheld if based on substantial
evidence. Clements v. Utah State Tax Commission, 893 P.2d 1078 (Utah App. 1995).
This argument was preserved for appeal by Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(R 135-187).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT
ISSUE
The relevant portions of the Utah Code and the Midvale City Code are included
in an Addendum hereto including:
Title 47 Chapter 1 Utah Code Ann. on Nuisances
§ 76-10-801 et seq. Utah Code Ann. on Nuisances
§ 17-3-4 Midvale City Code on Conditional Use Permits
§ 17-4-1 et seq. Midvale City Code on Planning Commission
3STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case
This is an appeal of a Conditional Use Permit by Salt Lake City. Plaintiff is a
restaurant, and also features live music and dancing pursuant to a Conditional Use
Permit previously granted by the City.  The City, through its Planning Commission
and City Counsel, revoked that Permit.  The City has claimed that adverse effects to
the neighborhood from the operation of the establishment require such action.
Plaintiff claims to have fully complied with the Permit.  
The trial Court issued a preliminary injunction against the revocation and then
dissolved that injunction and found in favor of the City.  The Court did, however,
issue a stay of its order pending appeal.  This action is a review of the action of the
City in making the revocation.
STATEMENT OF  FACTS
The transcript of the proceedings before the City Planning Commission
and the City Counsel were submitted to the Court in a binder, now designated as R.
351.  References to the transcript contained therein will be to page numbers of that
transcript, “Tr.”   Plaintiff is the owner of Salon Tropicana located at 7980 South
State, Midvale, Utah.   Plaintiff was previously issued a conditional use permit  for
4live music and dancing.  R. 13-22.  The business has been open and doing business
for over six years.   Plaintiff’s lease is for a small part of the premises only, and does
not extend to exclusive control of the parking lot in which certain activities are
alleged to have occurred.  Plaintiff is not exclusively responsible for those  activities.
It shares a parking lot with a bowling alley and with other businesses.  Like this
business, the bowling alley remains open late at night and generates traffic.  R.162-
174.  The business is open only three nights a week, Friday through Sunday.  On
Friday and Saturday nights the establishment features live music and dancing, as well
as a full buffet dinner for its patrons.  R. 41-42.  The business fronts on State Street,
but is part of a strip mall at that location which extends away from State Street
towards a residential area to the rear. The area is industrial in nature. R. 42, 177-187.
Beginning in the spring of 2008, Plaintiff’s retained counsel  made continuing
efforts to resolve differences between his establishment and the City, with very little
interest or response from the City.  R. 49-78.  The City has been non-responsive to
their overture.  A hearing was held before the Midvale City Planning Commission on
September 10, 2008. In addition to the hearing, several residents of the nearby
neighborhood filed affidavits with the Planning Commission.  R. 351.  
In 2005, this business and the City entered into a security agreement, whereby
5Plaintiff would provide parking lot security, and would take steps to reduce traffic
overflow, noise, litter, and other activities of concern to the neighbors. R. 23-26;  Tr.
11.  The meeting opened with the City Attorney, Craig Hall, presenting to the
Planning Commission a series of police reports which were made over a period of
time in the area of Plaintiff’s business.  He also supplied copies if the affidavits
referenced above.  According to Mr. Hall, the problems with the business include:
underage drinking, offenses against public decency, indecent acts, allowing
drinking and loitering and other illegal activities in the parking lot, nightclub
patrons parking in the adjacent residential neighborhood, . . . [and] excessive
noise generated in the parking lot. (Tr. 12).
Several people spoke to the Planning Commission, including City employees, and
neighbors of the business.  No oaths were administered, the rules of evidence were
not observed, and there was no opportunity to coss-examine.  Sergeant Salazar from
the Midvale Police stated that there were 36 arrests in the parking lot at Plaintiff’s
business for alcohol violations in April and May, 2008.  There were also 24 arrests
for public urination, which is under the general heading of lewdness.  One person told
the detective that the bathrooms at the Tropicana were closed, and there was no other
place to go.  The parking lot “is utter chaos the evenings of live bands”.  Eleven cars
were towed for parking  on Wilson, St, to the west of the parking lot.  There were six
6arrests for misdemeanor drug possession.  There was no statement by the sergeant that
the business had been notified of the arrests, or had been warned about the conduct
in the parking lot and surrounding areas.  And there were no statements as to whether
the  arrests resulted in convictions.  Tr. 16-18.   Mayor JoAnn Seghini said she had
walked the neighborhood on a Sunday and Monday.  There was a lot of glass,
discarded cans and bottles; and the City streets department sweeper has to go there
weekly.  There has been damage to lawns and it is obvious that people park in areas
of the neighborhood and leave trash.  It creates a dangerous environment for the
people of the neighborhood.  Tr. 18-21.
Plaintiff’s counsel said that the club is a comfortable place to visit.  The
parking lot is patrolled by outside security.  The back entrance to the parking lot has
been blocked off, and customers are not allowed to park there.  The establishment has
offered to employ off-duty police officers as additional security.  That would require
City permission, which has been withheld without giving a reason.  The business is
only open Friday, Saturday and Sunday nights.  The staff has been instructed to go
a block in every direction and pick up items of trash after closing.  Tr. 21-25.   Lewis
Kennedy, the president of Complete Security Services said that he provides security
on Friday and Saturday nights.  The rear entrance to the parking lot is blocked off
7with a van.  A security person stands in the parking lot and directs traffic.  Two
people on Friday nights, and four people on Saturday nights patrol the parking lot full
time.  These are in addition to Salon Tropicana’s own security personnel who work
the door area, as well as inside.  No public urination is allowed.  People who attempt
to do so are removed from the property immediately.  If people are seen drinking in
the parking lot, they are told to leave, and are not allowed in the club.  If they appear
intoxicated, the police are called to avoid them driving.  There have been some fights
in the parking lot, but they and the in-house security break it up, and make sure that
they leave separately.  Glass bottles and cans are confiscated.  Tr. 26-32.
David Kifuri, one of the owners said that there have been no citations issued
to the club for any reason.  There have been no citations, complaints or warnings by
the DABC which supervises their alcohol sales.  The establishment is a restaurant
with entertainment, and it is family friendly.  They were not told of any problems in
the parking lot and surrounding area until the City started talking about revoking the
license or conditional use permit.  When the place first opened, they blocked the rear
entrance to the parking lot, but were told to remove that barrier, by the City.  They
asked the City to post “no parking” signs in the rear, but they did not.  Only very
recently, the City painted the curb red.  They do not allow urination in the parking lot.
8Security handles any problems.  Beer, or any other liquid, is not allowed to come out
of the establishment.  If security people see beer in a car, it will be confiscated.  They
are not allowed in. The business has requested permission to employ off-duty police
officers, but have been refused.  They have over twenty of their own security people.
The rest rooms are adequate.  The men’s room has 8 stalls.  Arrests for drug use have
been as a result of them calling the police.  Drug use is not tolerated.  Tr. 32-42.  
Susan Skog saif that she lives on Wilson St., to the rear (west)of the parking
lot.  Her husband is in the military.  They have children, aged 11 and 13.  There have
been problems for about three years.  Cars lining the street every Friday and Saturday
night.  People are drinking in their cars. Then they walk over to the Tropicana.  On
Sunday mornings, she has to sweep up broken glass and cigarette butts.  Her neighbor
saw a marijuana cigarette in the gutter.  Pieces of Corona beer bottles have been
pulled out of tires.  They met with the business owners a year ago, hoping to stop the
problems, but they did not stop.  There has been so much urination in the area that the
lawn will not grow.  On one Monday morning a couple of weeks ago, there were 16
beer bottles picked up in one block. There was a syringe in a planter box. There have
been  fights in front of her home.  The no parking signs and red curb stop her from
having parties.  Tr. 46-51.  Jack Hendrickson said that he owns Eagle Machine, “just
9on the other side of the fence from the Tropicana”.  He has had beer bottles thrown
at his door and has had graffiti on the wall in front of his building three times in the
last year.  Within the last month, he had a prowler, who climbed the fence behind
Caesar’s Motorcycle shop (to the north, away from Plaintiff’s business).  A car came
up, and the prowler jumped in.  “They are actually using all that traffic and those
parking and the problems that are going on and the confusion to burglarize our
neighborhood.”  Neighbors have had meat stolen from their freezer, windows broken,
and a stereo stolen.  Now they have painted the curb red, and people can’t even have
company park in front of their homes.     There is a lot of construction going on, on
the bridge in the area.  People try and cut through to get around it, and are throwing
bottles and cans on the street.   There is noise late at night with stereos booming. (Tr.
51-56).  Caesar Boswell said he owns the motorcycle shop at 7922 South State St.
He has been in business 31 years.  There is a parking problem in front of his place.
His sidewalk and front parking is covered with beer bottles.  Recently he saw a man
with no shirt, and in handcuffs, running through his yard.  Tropicana Security caught
him and held onto him, but he escaped again.  There does not seem to be enough
parking.  (Tr. 56-58).  Eric Skog, the husband or Susan Skog said he would be
deployed in the military in March, 2009, and hoped problems would be solved by
10
then, so he would not have to worry about his family while he was gone. (Tr. 58).
Allen Diamond said that he is one of the heads of security at Salon Tropicana.
He takes his job seriously and patrols the back to prevent people from parking on the
back streets.  They prevent people from bringing drinks out of the establishment, and
patrol to avoid drinking in the parking lot.  They cannot patrol streets to prevent
anyone from drinking on public streets, but do prevent it in their parking lot.  They
try and prevent, or break up, any fights; and they happen occasionally as with any
entertainment facility.
Nick Loulas said that  he lives on the corner of Wasatch and Wilson.  There
have been bottles and cans thrown over the fence into his back yard.  He thinks that
homeowners should be given passes for company to park in front of their homes at
red curbs.  (Tr. 60-61).  
Christopher Ham said that he also works security at Tropicana.  He does not
think the bottles and cans seen in the neighborhood can be coming from the club.  If
people park their vehicles in back of the parking lot, they are told to remove them. 
Tr. 61-62.
 John Hendrickson said that he lives at 7887 South Taft St., and is the son of
Jack, the owner of the machine shop.  He picks up bottles and a lot of glass.  He has
11
also painted the cinder block wall between the club and the shop to remove graffiti.
He fears for his kids going out after dark.  Tr. 63-64.  Ryan Meinzer said that lives
at 7924 Wilson St.  He thinks that Tropicana has been doing the best it can.  But it’s
not enough.  There are problems with trash and noise.  The area just isn’t safe
anymore. Tr. 64-66.
Jonathan Gambough said that he also works security.  There are other places
in the area, including clubs, and a 7-11 where the bottles and cans may be coming
from; but they do not come from Tropicana.  Tr.66-67.   Sergio Hernandez said that
he is head of security at Tropicana.  If he sees people coming in who are drunk or
who are drinking, they are not allowed in.  He thinks solutions should be found
without throwing around a lot of accusations. Tr. 68-69. 
Juliette Meinzer said that she is afraid to allow her kids to walk to the 7-11 or
the library.  She is concerned about bottles and glass, and thinks maybe Tropicana can
hire someone on weekends to sweep thing up.  There was a stabbing in front of one
of the duplexes late at night.  Tr. 69-71.   Wayne Staker lives a block away from the
Tropicana parking lot, but still finds trash in his yard.  There is too much traffic and
noise in the neighborhood at night. Tr. 71-73.  
Sandra Cezares said that she works security at the door of Tropicana.  She
12
works the parking lot as well, and tries to make sure no illegal activity goes on there.
She thinks alcohol in the area is coming from 7-11.  Tropicana is a nice place to go
and to work.   Tr. 73-74.
Rueben Soriano said that he is a customer, who has brought his family.  He has
been there on two holiday weekends, on Sunday nights.  They have had things well
under control.  On one occasion, when he left the club first, and his wife stayed
behind a few minutes, security did approach him in the parking lot to ask why he was
just sitting there.  Tr. 76-77.
 Adam Robinson said that he lives on Wilson St.  There are problems pretty
much only one night a week, on Saturday, but it is really bad on that night.  There
have been stabbings and a shooting, and things need to be cleaned up. Tr. 79-80.
Keith Freeman said that he is the landlord.  He met with Mr. Hall and
suggested the use of off-duty Midvale police officers as additional security.  That was
denied, so he spent a great deal of time and effort contacting the Sheriff’s office and
had it worked out with them.  Then Midvale sued the landlord and Tropicana,
claiming it was a nuisance.  He then met with the mayor, and was told that he was
wasting his time and effort, that they would not agree to any such solution.  Tr. 86-88.
After the public comment period expired, the Commission asked additional
13
questions of David Kifuri, one of the owners.  Re-entry is only allowed under
supervised circumstances, if an employee goes out with someone who has left
something in his car.  When the club gets to capacity, there is sometimes a line for
those waiting to go in.  As many as 60 people have been lined up.  The number of
people allowed inside, or in line, is not more than the parking lot capacity.  Once that
is reached, people are turned away.  People are not allowed to park on the streets to
the west and to come in from there.  There is another bar, the Tradewinds, in the same
complex, and a bowling alley, and a restaurant nearby that sells beer, as well as 7-11.
No beer comes from Tropicana, so it must come from elsewhere. Nobody is allowed
to loiter in the parking lot.  He did not think a small and orderly line was a breach of
the agreement, but it will be discontinued immediately.  Nobody has notified them of
problems they say are happening, including urination, etc.  They only found out about
such allegations when this action started.  The City says to call the police if there are
problems, and then the police are upset that they are called.  They have repeatedly
asked for permission to employ off-duty police officers as security, and have been
denied. Tr. 90-117.
The Commission proceeded to make a decision without any written findings.
Instead, Mr. Smith suggested the following as a basis for revoking the conditional use
14
permit:
I’d like to make a Motion based on the findings of traffic on Wilson, bottles
and trash within two-block radius of the establishment, the ruckus and noise,
the garbage left behind, the public concerns, public intoxication, and the
parking and loitering from crowds being left in the parking lot, finding that
Salon Tropicana has violated the conditions of its permit, and has been given
sufficient opportunities to address past violations, and has failed to do so.  This
would require the Planning Commission to revoke the Conditional Use Permit
under section 17-3-4 of the zoning Ordinance.  Without the Conditional Use
Permit, the live entertainment and dance would no longer be allowed as part
of the Salon Tropicana operation.  Tr. 123-124.
This Motion was passed unanimously, after being amended “to also include the
neighbors’ affidavits and the police reports”. Tr. 125.  The affidavits of residents in
the neighborhood were consistent with the statements made by those same people at
the Planning Commission meeting.  An appeal to the City Council was promptly
taken from the decision.  The City Council, with no additional evidence, sustained the
Planning Commission, at its meeting on October 7.  The final order of revocation was
to be effective upon preparation of findings of fact, and final action by the City
Council meeting of October 21.  R.  33-35.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
 ARGUMENT 
POINT I
15
THE PROCESS OF TERMINATING A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT THROUGH
A PUBLIC HEARING DENIES DUE PROCESS OF LAW TO THE PERMIT
HOLDER.
The loss of the conditional use permit for a business which has existed for
many years, and which depends substantially on the continued good will of its
clientele, is certainly an irreparable injury.  As with a business license, there is a
property interest in the permit, and it should not be subject to revocation without due
process of law.
 The City was without legal authority to revoke Plaintiff’s conditional use
permit license as it did, through the use of a public hearing without any semblance of
procedural rights, and without either a criminal conviction or a district Court nuisance
proceeding.   In  Whiting v. Clayton, 617 P.2d 362 (Utah 1980), the City of Midvale
made an administrative finding that the business operated by Plaintiff was a nuisance,
and abated that nuisance by revoking the business license. The Utah Supreme Court
found that this was a misuse of both the City ordinances and State statutes on the
abatement of nuisances and the granting and revocation of business licenses. While
the Court found that an alcoholic beverage license can be revoked when “necessary
for the protection of public peace and morals”; a business license may not be so easily
revoked, as there exists a property interest in that license, which requires due process.
16
As the Court indicated in Whiting, the established procedure for abating a nuisance
is by filing an action for abatement in the District Court.  The procedures are
addressed both in the Criminal Code, § 76-10-801 et seq., and in Title 47, Chapter 1,
entitled “Nuisances”.  Both chapters define a nuisance to include allegations similar
to those made by the City here. Section 47-1-1 U.C.A.  defines a nuisance to include
“any building, structure or place, for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or
prostitution”.   Section 76-10-803 U.C.A. defines a nuisance to include doing acts
which “offends public decency”.  The County (District) Attorney, the City Attorney,
or even a citizen may file the appropriate action with the District Court to abate the
nuisance.  The Supreme Court, in Whiting specifically found that a city administrative
proceeding which declared the business to be a nuisance, and revoked the business
license, was without statutory authority:
We are referred by the City to no authority either in its ordinances or in state
statutes which permit it to revoke the amusement and business licenses on the
basis of an administrative finding of a nuisance.  To this extent, the City
exceeded its authority in revoking these licenses and ordering the business
closed. 617 P.2d at 365 
 
In this case, the City has not attempted to revoke the license for alcoholic beverages,
which would appear to be subject to less of a procedural due process requirement.
There have been, however, no grounds asserted to support such a revocation.  The
17
City actually has commenced a nuisance action in the Third District Court, but has
not proceeded on it.  See  Midvale City v. Salon Tropicana, Civil No. 080914839,
pending before Judge Hilder.  If the City wishes to use allegations of nuisance to
revoke the conditional use permit, it should proceed on that action and obtain a
judgment to that effect.  Attempting to short-circuit the process here is legally
insufficient.
The alternative, under Whiting, is to obtain a criminal conviction of the
business or someone in a position of responsibility with the business.  Allegations
brought in a City  Planning meeting as to the conduct of others, not under the control
of Plaintiff, are insufficient under the City Code, under State statute, and specifically
under Whiting.  As earlier stated in Anderson v. Utah County Board of County
Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1979):
On the other hand, inasmuch as the licensing of his business does represent a
substantial property interest to the plaintiff, which also has its effect upon the
public welfare, it should not be destroyed or disrupted arbitrarily, nor without
following fundamental standards of due process of law to guard against
capricious or oppressive administrative action.
   If the City had regularly complained to management, of misconduct on the
premises, perhaps a Court could find that there was a pattern of misconduct
amounting to a nuisance and would have issued an abatement order; but the City kept
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most of its investigations secret from the business owner; and no court has  taken
abatement action.  If the City had taken criminal action against the business, instead
of against customers, and proved to a court that the conduct was encouraged by the
business (which they apparently were not prepared to do), the alcohol license, the
business license, or the conditional use permit could be revoked as a result of those
criminal convictions.  But, they chose to do  what the Supreme Court said they cannot
do – proceed administratively without any competent findings of misconduct; and
such is a denial of due process.  The proceeding before the City Planning Commission
did not constitute due process.  Rather than putting on witnesses who would be
subject to cross examination, the Planning Commission held a public hearing in
which citizens were allowed to make statements, not under oath, and not subject to
cross-examination or standards of proof.  That led to allegations of misconduct which
were not proved, other than by rumor and innuendo.   Members of the Planning
Commission are City appointees and can be expected to give deference to the Mayor
and the planning staff when they are asked directly to take action.  The Supreme
Court of California, in Haas v. County of San Bernardino, 45 P.3d 280 (Cal. 2002)
invalidated a review scheme where haring examiners were hired on an ad hoc basis,
as the implication was that hearing examiners would only be granted additional cases
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if they favored the City in their decisions.  The bias of the Planning Commission
members raises the same questions.
  This Court found the revocation of a business license was arbitrary and
capricious in the recent case of 14  Street Gym v. Salt Lake City Corp., 183 P.3d 262,th
2008,UT App 127 (Utah App. 2008).  The  Plaintiff’s position here is remarkably
similar to that of the Plaintiff in 14  Street Gym:  th
Over the years, the City has had concerns about illicit sexual activity occurring
on Gym premises.  In November 2000, the Gym entered into a stipulation with
the City to hire additional employees to monitor the premises and guard against
improper conduct.  Between October 2003 and October 2004, City police
officers entered the Gym as paying members and observed various incidents
of lewd conduct including masturbation and oral sex.  These incidents were
primarily observed in the Gym’s steam room and resulted in at least two
citations for illegal activity.  ¶ 3.
In January 2005, a City hearing officer conducted a hearing (the 2005)
Hearing) concerning the possible revocation of the Gym’s business license due
to lewd activity on the premises.  The hearing officer made findings that lewd
conduct occurred on Gym premises on five separate occasions between
October 2003 and October 2004; that the lewd conduct constituted violations
of City code provisions and warranted suspension or revocation of the Gym’s
license; that an employee of the Gym’ “condoned, encouraged, or turned a
blind eye towards the lewd conduct”; and that the Gym’s ownership had “an
opportunity and a duty to know about the lewd conduct occurring at [the]
business.”  Pursuant to these findings, the hearing officer entered an order (the
2005 Order) suspending the Gym’s business license outright for ninety days,
and provisionally for another 270 days.  The 2005 Order stated that “[i]f any
problems arise in the nine months following the first 90-day period, the license
will be revoked after a hearing is held and the hearing examiner determines
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that a violation has occurred.”¶ 4 
In March 2006, the City held another license revocation hearing (the 2006
Hearing) pertaining to the Gym.  Testimony at the hearing included that of
Williams; Kim Oliver, the City detective who had made the 2005 lewdness
arrests; Edna Drake, a City business licensing officer; and A.J. Busch, the
Gym’s owner.  Busch testified to steps he had taken since the 2005 Order to
prevent recurrences of lewd conduct on the premises.  Neverthless, in light of
the June 2005 arrests, the hearing officer entered an order (the 2006 Order)
reiterating the 2005 Order’s provisional operating language, determining that
another violation had occurred on Gym’s premises, and stating that “the 2005
Order has been abrogated and, therefore, there will be a revocation.” ¶ 6.
The 2006 Order revoked the Gym’s license solely based on violations of City
code by two persons who were not Gym employees or agents.  While it is
possible that these acts could also represent code violations by the Gym if the
Gym knew of, should have known of, or condoned the acts, the 2006 Order
made no such findings.  Nor is there evidence in the record particularly
supporting such a conclusion.  Indeed, the hearing officer commented at the
2006 hearing:
I’m not saying, not saying that Mr. Busch or anybody at the 14  Streetth
Gym has precipitated the problem that we’re talking about today with
the arrest and the conviction of these two individuals who now are not
members and were not employees, and there’s no testimony that they
were even volunteers . . . .
In light of the record, and our conclusion that the 2005 Order allowed for
revocation of the Gym’s provisional license only upon further violation by the
Gym, we determine that the City’s revocation of the Gym’s license for the
actions of third persons, without any finding of culpability on the part of the
Gym, was arbitrary and capricious.  ¶ 15  
In both cases, there had been previous actions in which the Plaintiff had been warned
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about its conduct. Both cases resulted in an order, or agreement, to take care of
problems.  And in both cases, the Plaintiff has claimed that they have done all that
they are legally required to do to maintain their license or permit.  The result
demanded by the City is contrary to due process, and not in the interest of justice.  As
with the Gym, the City’s tolerance of this business  for five years, in which Plaintiff
has received no citations for unlawful conduct, belies the City’s claim that a
revocation is required. 
The Court’s Order granting Summary Judgment to the City and denying it to
the Plaintiff relied on Midvale City Code § 17-3-4.g. which states as follows:
If the community and economic development department determines that the
folder of a conditional use permit or an administrative conditional user permit
is in violation of the terms or conditions upon which the permit was issued, the
community and economic development department shall notice the permit
holder and schedule a hearing before the planning commission at which the
permit holder must show cause to the planning commission why the
conditional use permit or administrative conditional use permit should not be
revoked. If the planning commission determines that the terms or conditions
of the permit have been violated, it shall cause the permit holder to specify how
the holder will promptly comply with the terms and conditions of the permit,
or it shall revoke the permit.
The Court found this to be adequate legal basis for the decision of the City
Planning Commission in revoking the conditional use permit. The Ordinance cited,
however, seems to contemplate granting the permit holder  an opportunity to “show
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cause” why the revocation should not be made. That comes after the determination
has been made that the permit has been violated. That is not what actually happened
in this case. The hearing before the Planning Commission was basically a gripe
session by neighbors to the rear of Plaintiff’s business. Plaintiff was not allowed to
adequately respond to those grips and complaints. After the neighbors had their say,
one of Plaintiffs owners was asked several questions by the commission members, but
that certainly does not meet the standards of the ordinance. Not only, then, did the
proceedings before the commission violate due process, but they did not meet the
fairness standards set forth in the City’s own ordinance. For this reason additionally,
the proceedings before the City Planning Commission were inadequate. 
Defendant started out its argument below by citing a case, Diamond B-Y
Ranches v. Tooele County, 2004 UT App 135, 91 P.3d 841 (Utah App. 2004), “which
casts doubts as to whether a plaintiff has a property interest in a conditional use
permit itself where denial of the permit would not leave the real property
economically idle.” (Def. memo.,fn. 1).  The City has exaggerated its support for the
City’s position.  That case, as the Court made clear, was more focused on a
“regulatory taking” which is compensable under the Fifth Amendment.  The Court
ruled against the City, which claimed that it had not taken anything of value in
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refusing th grant the conditional use permit.  In this case, the facts are that, while the
business is licensed as a restaurant, it is not economically viable without the
conditional use permit.  That really is the major issue between the parties.  The City
claims that the very economical viability of the property is why the conditional use
permit must be withdrawn.  Making the property viable just makes too much noise,
brings in too much traffic, and causes too many headaches for the neighbors.  So, the
City is not aiming just at the conditional use permit; they are aiming to reduce the
noise, traffic and other problems by starving the business of customers.  The City
points out that it does not seek to totally kill the business, as it has not attempted to
withdraw the beer license or the business license itself.  The business can stay, the
City proclaims, as long is it doesn’t draw enough customers to succeed.  That is
exactly what this Court ruled is compensable in the Tooele case.   This business is
located in a large basement area of a strip mall.  It has a large parking lot, and it is
nestled among an auto body shop, a machine shop, a tire store and an auto parts store.
The City says it is not compatible with the neighborhood; but it is hard to imagine
what use could be made of this property which would satisfy the neighbors.  Because
the City knows there can be no viable use of this area without this kind of permit, it
does not need to use other possible avenues of closure.  Thus, the procedure used is
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very much open to attack on due process grounds.  If the process is not fundamentally
fair, it fails as a violation of property rights.  This process was not designed to fairly
prove that Plaintiff had failed to conform with the conditional use permit, it was a
purely political process in which the Mayor took the personal lead, out walking the
neighborhood to show distressed neighbors that she cared.  The outcome was never
in doubt, and had little to do with the “evidence” introduced at the hearing.  The
Midvale Code section that is cited by the City (Memo. p. 21-22) grants power to the
Planning Commission to revoke the permit if it “determines that the terms or
conditions of the permit have been violated.”  That is a factual determination to be
reviewed by the Court.  While the Planning Commission may deserve some deference
in such a decision, the Court is certainly empowered to review the factual
determination with a more neutral eye, and outside of the presence of a bunch of
upset property owners.    
The City specifically cites to only one item in the transcript where it claims
there is direct evidence of a violation.  That (fn. 4) is that there have been instances
of people lining up outside the business waiting for an opportunity to go inside.
While the manager, Mr. Kifuri, Stated that he did not understand that as a violation,
he pledged to immediately discontinue the practice, and to make sure that people were
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turned away when maximum capacity was reached.  Certainly, that is a small
violation which does not support the drastic measure now sought.  And it is quite
remote from the complaints made by the City and the neighbors.   It would be better
policy, of course, for the City and the business to work together to solve any such
problems.  The City retorts that it does not have to work with businesses to solve
problems; but it does not have the power to be arbitrary and capricious; and this is but
one example of being so.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION, AS UPHELD BY THE
CITY COUNCIL, WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
Under Whiting and Triangle Oil, Inc.  v. North Salt Lake Corp., 609 P.2d 1338
(Utah 1980), the action of the City in revoking a business license will not be upheld
if that action is determined to be “arbitrary and capricious”.  The conduct used as the
basis for the revocation was not the conduct of the business itself, but allegedly that
of the customers.  Even though officers had allegedly observed improper conduct on
the part of customers on previous occasions, they did not report it to management.
No citations were issued for any violations to the business or any of its employees.
The problems are compounded by the way in which the hearing was conducted.
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Neighbors and others opposed to the business were allowed to state their objections
and to tell stories of incidents that may or may not have had any relation to the
Plaintiff’s business.  Prowlers in the neighborhood, graffiti on the wall of an auto
wrecking yard, and bottles thrown from passers-by in an area of heavy highway and
bridge construction were attributed to Plaintiff without any basis for such allegations.
Statements of some residents were to the effect that some of the problems in the
neighborhood are due to the highway construction. (Tr. 54) Obviously, some is due
to the nature of the State Street area and to other businesses and heavy traffic.  The
City has actively discouraged, and even interfered with, efforts to solve any problems
with additional security.  The mayor told the landlord, Mr. Freeman, not to waste any
more time trying to solve the problems, as the City would not accept anything but a
closure. (Tr. 87).  This statement, in advance of the Planning Commission hearing,
shows that Plaintiff could not have expected a fair hearing in this matter.
In the Salt Lake City hearing in the 14  Street Gym matter, witnesses wereth
called under oath, and then they were cross-examined by counsel for the Gym.  It was
still not sufficient to uphold the closure.  Nothing approaching that kind of procedural
due process took place in Midvale.  Some of the stories (to call it testimony is
misleading) were incredible, and obviously much was irrelevant.  There were vague
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references to a stabbing and a shooting in the neighborhood, but no details as to time
or how these incidents might be related to Plaintiff’s business.  The use of such
extraneous material created prejudice in the minds of Planning Commission members,
without any real probative value.  Any decision based on it is clearly arbitrary and
capricious. 
The District Court’s ruling, in responding to Plaintiffs myriad concerns, simply
states:
The record contains substantial evidence to support the Midvale City Planning
Commission’s and City Council’s determinations that violations of the
conditional use permit had occurred and, accordingly, substantial evidence
supports the decision to revoke Plaintiff’s conditional use permit.
The Court failed, in its Order, to point out any of the substantial evidence on which
the City could validly support its decision to revoke the permit. Once again, it is
inadequate for the Court to respond to the Plaintiff’s objections with a short
conclusory Order. The Court should have set forth adequate and substantial basis for
the revocation of the permit. The Court Order does not address Plaintiff’s arguments
that the Order was indeed arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the Trial Court’s Order
gives little for this Court to review. This Court, therefore, is required to review the
evidence anew. While this Court is required to give deference to findings of fact made
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by the lower Court, no such findings of fact where made. There is nothing on which
this Court can base its affirmance of the Trial Court’s ruling.   Once again, citing
Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of County Com’rs., 589 P.2d 1214. 1215-1216 (Utah
1979):
[1] We agree with the plaintiff’s contention that the forgoing are not really
“findings of fact” but are simply recitals of procedure. They do not constitute
findings as required by Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., which provides:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . ., the court shall find
the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon .
. .. [Emphasis added.]
[2,3] It is true that we indulge the presumption of regularity in the proceedings
before the trial court. But this does not suffice when the record itself exposes
essential deficiencies. With certain exceptions, not applicable here, the just-
quoted rule must be complied with and a judgment cannot stand unless there
are findings which will justify it.
[4,5] The failure of the trial court to enter adequate findings requires that the
judgment be vacated.  
As in Anderson, the court below did not make adequate findings on which this Court
can affirm.    This decision should be vacated and remanded for findings which show
that the decision of the City was not arbitrary and capricious, and was indeed
supported by substantial evidence.
Reversing the revocation of the Conditional Use Permit does not leave the City
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or the neighbors without remedy for continuing problems.  The City can go forward
with its nuisance action, if it wishes to do so.  If Plaintiff commits violations, it can
be cited, and convictions of violations may be separate grounds for a revocation.  If
there are alcohol violations, there can be an action to revoke the alcohol license.
And, if there are continued criminal activities in the area, the law most certainly can
and should be enforced.  The police reports show a sporadic and half-hearted
enforcement effort.  And, of course, the City can give their permission to use  off-duty
law enforcement officers from the Sheriff’s department.  The facts point to a
conclusion that the City has never considered the myriad of alternatives to this
improper revocation action; and forcing them to do so will not put the neighborhood
at additional risk .
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s business, a restaurant with music and dancing, has been in business
since 2003.  In 2005, after concerns were expressed over noise and other unwanted
activities, Plaintiff agreed to a security plan to control the problems in the parking lot
and adjacent areas.  Testimony at the Planning Commission hearing is that the plan
has been complied with.  There remain problems and concerns; but the area has been
involved with highway construction, is home to industrial businesses, and is on a
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heavily traveled State highway.  The conduct complained of cannot be attributed to
Plaintiffs, and is legally insufficient to support a conditional use permit revocation.
Further, the procedures used by the City do not comport with due process of law, and
did not give Plaintiff a fair and proper chance to be heard.  This Court must find that
the decision of the City Planning Commission, as affirmed by the City Council and
the District Court, is arbitrary and capricious, and not based on sound legal or factual
grounds.
DATED this____ day of May, 2009.
       W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C.       
                                                          _____________________________________
                 W. Andrew McCullough
                 Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _______ day of May, 2009, I did hand deliver two
true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, to H. Craig Hall Attorney
for Appellee, 201 South Main St., Suite 2000,  Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
                                                                        
                                                   ___________________________________
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ADDENDUM
A.  Plaintiff’s Complaint and Attachments
1W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. (2170)
Attorney for Plaintiff
6885 South State Street, Suite 200
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone:  (801) 565-0894
     
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
               
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
                         ---oooOooo---
 :  
SALON TROPICANA, INC.,         :    COMPLAINT
a Utah corporation,            :     
 :
Plaintiff,  :   
 :                
vs.                            :    Civil No. 080922860         
                               :
CITY OF MIDVALE                :  
                               :    Judge Christiansen
                               :    
Defendant.
                         ---oooOooo---
COMES NOW the Plaintiff who complains of Defendant and for causes
of action alleges as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation Company, with its
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
is the owner of Salon Tropicana located at 7920 South State,
Midvale, Utah.
22.  Plaintiff was previously issued a conditional use permit
was issued for live music and dancing.  A copy of that Conditiona
Use Permit is attached hereto, labeled “Exhibit A”, and by
reference made a part hereof.
  3.  The business has been open and doing business the same way
for five years.  When Plaintiff applied for its first license, its
agent, Frank Musil, outlined his business plan; and the City
Planning Commission approved it the way it was proposed.  The
business sells nothing but internet time on one of its 19
computers. 
4.  
6.  On November 21, 2007, the City Business Licensing
Official, Tracy Swenson, sent a letter to Petitioner by the
Director of Community Development, Larry Gardner, stating that the
conditional use permit had also been revoked, and setting out an
identical appeal procedure.  A copy of that Notice is attached
hereto, labeled “Exhibit B” and by reference made a part hereof.
8.  A timely appeal from the license revocation notice was
filed,  This appeal is adequate to address the conditional use
permit issues as well.  A copy of that appeal is attached hereto,
labeled “Exhibit C”, and by reference made a part hereof.
39.  The City objected to Plaintiff’s appeal documents,
indicating that the timeliness and manner of the appeal were
inadequate.
10.  A hearing was held before the City Planning commission on
September 10, 2008.  While indicating its preliminary decision that
the appeal was properly filed, the hearing officer asked for
additional briefing on legal matters before making his decision,
which additional briefing was filed with the City in January, 2008.
11.  There has been no decision from the hearing officer; and
the business has been operating as usual since the original notice
was sent.  
12.  In January, 2008, Plaintiff received a letter from the
South Salt Lake Business License official, dated January 17, 2008,
a copy of which is attached hereto, labeled “Exhibit D” and by
reference made a part hereof, that its application for a 2008
business license would be held until the earlier revocation action
was completed, which has never occurred.
13.  On or about September 16, 2008, South Salt Lake police
officers posted the business with a “closing order” issued by the
City Department of Community and Economic Development, and required
the business to be immediately closed and vacated.  No other
4documents were served on Plaintiff, nor was Plaintiff given an
opportunity to respond or otherwise contest this action.  
14.  The City’s attempt to close this business is  in
violation of law, is ultra vires and is without due process; and
the closure will cause immediate and irreparable harm for which
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.
15.  Closing the business will interfere with customer
relations and good will, developed over several years; and it will
adversely affect several employees and their families. No amount of
damages will repair the harm done by this City action.
16.  Issuing a temporary inunction will merely preserve the
status quo, and will not be in violation of public policy, nor will
it be adverse to the public interest.
17.  Plaintiff is entitled to an immediate order of this court
restraining and enjoining the City from interfering with the lawful
conducting of business, until a hearing can be held, and a
determination can be made as to the legality of the City’s actions.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
18.  Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 17 above as
though they were fully set forth herein.
19. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the Utah
5Declaratory Judgment Act, Section 78-33-1 et seq. 
20. Pursuant to the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act (Section 78-
33-1 U.C.A.), this Court has power “to declare rights, status and
other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed.
21. Further, pursuant to the Act in Section 78-33-2 U.C.A.,
“any person interested under  a deed, will or written contract, or
whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a
statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise, and
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder.”
22. This statute allows the Court discretion to deny
declaratory relief, pursuant to Section 78-33-6 U.C.A. if the
judgment “would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving
rise to the proceeding.” This Defendant alleges that the high state
of uncertainty over the meaning of the terms of this ordinance was
deliberate and willful on the part of the Midvale City Council, in
that this Defendant has the legal right to terminate that
uncertainty by declaratory judgment herein.
623. Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the
actions of the City are without authority, are contrary to law, and
are without Due Process of Law.
24.  Further, Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment
that its business is legal and without cause for the actions the
City has taken against it.
 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
25.  Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 24 above as
though they were fully set forth herein.
26. This business is entitled to First Amendment protection
as an internet café, dealing primarily in information via the
internet.  As such, it is entitled to a prompt determination of the
issues which may affect its ability to do business, pursuant to
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) and FW/PBS v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); and failure to grant procedural due
process is a violation of those rights, and renders the actions of
the City without effect, and void.
27. Ordinances, rules and regulations which restrict
activities protected by the First Amendment, carry the burden of
presumed constitutional invalidity. See Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
728. Plaintiff has clearly the right to present and provide
presumptively protected services and materials for its patrons and
the public in general; and has a clear legal right to use and
operate its business without interference by Defendant, its agents,
servants or employees. Such lawful use may only be prevented,
terminated or modified after Plaintiff has been afforded due
process of law, which due process is lacking in the actions of the
City designed to prohibit Plaintiff from continuing its business.
29. Because the services provided by Plaintiff are protected
by the First Amendment, any action to restrict those services must
contain adequate procedural safeguards. City officials may not
unilaterally compel the cessation or prevent the initiation of
First Amendment activities in the absence of a judicial order to
that effect. The actions of Defendant, in imposing unlawful and
unconstitutional prior restraints on Plaintiff, will deprive
Plaintiff and its agents and employees, and the general public of
rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitution of the United
States.
30. Current actions of the City are specifically designed to
prohibit the sale of constitutionally protected services and
materials, and are not designed for any lawful purpose, such as the
8suppression of secondary effects. The actions of the City and its
City Council are thus an unconstitutional prior restraint.
31. Plaintiff's rights under the United States Constitution
have been violated in that the actions of the City of South Salt
Lake:
a. Abridge and restrain Plaintiff's rights to free
expression as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution;
b. Constitute a prior restraint on such expression;
c. Constitute an impermissible "chilling effect" on
constitutionally protected speech and expression;
d. Deny equal protection of the law in that legislation and
enforcement is arbitrary, oppressive and capricious and requires
Plaintiff to submit to controls not imposed on other similarly
situated businesses;
e. Are arbitrary and capricious as applied to the individual
business;
f. Are an unlawful exercise of the State's police power in
that there is no substantial relationship to the protection of the
public health and welfare or any legitimate governmental objective
and are based on an improper predicate;
9g. Are vague and indefinite and fail to set out distinct
criteria, thus leaving persons of common intelligence to guess as
to the meaning and differ as to its application;  
h. Unconstitutionally infringe on Plaintiff's rights to free
association;
i. Impermissibly delegate legislative and judicial authority
to administrative employees;
j. Constitute an unlawful and unauthorized taking of private
property without just compensation, without due process of law, and
without a public purpose, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution;
k. Lack adequate procedural safeguards and fail to provide
for prompt judicial review.  
l. Manifest an improper purpose in that the ordinances,
rules and regulations are not content-neutral and are not unrelated
to the suppression of free speech;
m. The restrictions on the First Amendment freedoms are
overbroad and far greater than are essential to the furtherance of
any alleged governmental interest;
n. Fail to leave open "adequate alternative avenues of
communication".
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32. All conditions precedent to the institution and
maintenance of this cause of action have occurred or have been
performed.
33. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.  No amount of
money damages could adequately compensate Plaintiff for the
irreparable harm described herein.  Plaintiff in this case wishes
to exercise its constitutional rights which are guaranteed to it
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Neither damages, replevin, attachment, nor any other legal remedy
will suffice to safeguard the exercise of those rights.  Plaintiff,
its agents, employees, patrons, and the public at large will suffer
irreparable injury if injunctive relief is not granted, and if
Defendant City of Sioux City is permitted to arbitrarily and
capriciously enforce rules, regulations and ordinances at issue
herein.  The loss of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment is so
serious that, as a matter of law, irreparable injury is presumed
and, in such an instance involving the loss of First Amendment
rights, damages are both inadequate and unascertainable.  
34.  The public interest would best be served by the granting
of injunctive relief; and the public interest is disserved by
permitting the enforcement of invalid rules, regulations and
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ordinances which interfere with the public's rights under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
35. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-34 above, as if fully
set forth herein.  
36.  Communication and activities protected by the First
Amendment are not subject to the issuance or denial of a
conditional use permit, as the ability to issue or deny such a
permit involves an impermissible level of discretion in the
licensing or land use authorities, under FW/PBS v. City of Dallas,
493 U.S. 215 (1990).
37.  Further, the conditional use permit was designated for a
“bingo parlor” or for amusement devices, neither of which applies
to this entity.  Plaintiff therefore need not obtain or retain such
a permit to continue its business.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
38. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-37,
above, as if fully set forth herein.
39.  The actions of the City in denying or revoking
Plaintiff’s business license without a hearing, without the
opportunity to appeal, and without due process of law are arbitrary
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and capricious as a matter of law.  No findings of fact or
conclusions of law have been made or entered; and there is no
record upon which to effectively appeal the decision of the City to
this Court, or to take any other action to effectively contest the
City’s decision.  This, the City’s actions are unlawful as a matter
of law.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
40. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-39,
above, as if fully set forth herein.
41. Plaintiff is the beneficial leaseholder of the property
specifically described herein.  
42. Use of the rules, regulations and ordinances as set forth
above constitute a constructive taking of the property interests of
Plaintiff in the real property and in the business property, which
taking is predicated on the arbitrary and capricious
characteristics of the rules, regulations and ordinances.
43. The taking herein described infringes on the use and
value of Plaintiff's business property to such an extent that it is
tantamount to a taking.  The taking of the property is arbitrary
and capricious and has no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare.  The taking is without
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compensation and without due process of law.  
44. Plaintiff has invested considerable sums of money to set
up its business, prepare the property, and engage in other
endeavors in furtherance of the establishment of a First Amendment
protected business on the property at issue.
45. The actions of the South Salt Lake Department of City
Department of Community and Economic Development constitutes a
taking of its business property without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
1.  For temporary injunctive relief prohibiting the City from
interfering with the lawful operation of Plaintiff’s business,
pending the outcome of this action; and for a permanent injunction
thereafter, granting the same relief.
2.  That the Court issue a Declaratory Judgment as to the
continuing legal operation of Plaintiff’s business as presently
constituted and narrowly construing necessary ordinances in a
manner which protects the Defendant from arbitrary and capricious
enforcement actions by the City.
3.  For a Declaratory Judgment that Defendant’s actions in
closing the business are arbitrary and capricious and without due
process of law, and without the opportunity to be heard or to
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effectively appeal the decisions of the City.  
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems
equitable and proper in the premises.
COMES NOW  Salon Tropicana Midvale, Inc., a Utah corporation, and
in answer to Plaintiff’s complaint herein on file, admits, denies
and alleges as follows:
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks equitable relief; and is subject
to equitable estoppel.  The allegations made by Plaintiff in
support of its complaint do not entitle it to the relief
requested. Defendant has fully complied with all requests made by
the City, within the limits of its ability, as to the abatement
of any situation or activity which might affect the comfortable
enjoyment of neighboring properties, or might be offensive to the
senses. Further, Plaintiff has actively interfered with the
efforts of this Defendant to increase security, by withholding
permission for Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs to aid with such
security. These efforts are in bad faith.
SIXTH DEFENSE
This Defendant is a leaseholder of the premises at 7980 S. State
15
St; but such lease is for a small part of the premises only, does
not extend to exclusive control of the parking lot in which
certain activities are alleged to have occurred; and is not
exclusively responsible for those  activities.                    
SEVENTH DEFENSE
This Defendant has no control over the activities which are
alleged to have occurred on public streets, and cannot be held
responsible for such activities.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff alleges a number of arrests in the vicinity of
this Defendant’s establishment for “lewdness”, which is a
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1), a class B misdemeanor. 
The actual allegations, however, are of violations of § 76-9-
702(5), a class C misdemeanor.   
TENTH DEFENSE
1.  This Defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraph 1 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
2.  This Defendant admits the allegations contained in
Paragraphs 2 through 5 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
3.  This Defendant admists that it leases a small part of
the premises alleged in paragraph 6 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, but
16
specifically denies that it leases all of that property or that
it has control of the parking lot at the property.
4.  This Defendant admits that this Court is the court of
general jurisdiction in Salt Lake County, and denies all other
allegations contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  
5.  This Defendant admits the allegations contained in
paragraph 8 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
6.  This Defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraph 9 of Plaintiff’s complaint.  
7.  This Defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraph 11 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  This Defendant 
affirmatively alleges that the conditional use permit is limited
to the presentation of music and dancing.  A violation of the
condition use permit does not constitute a nuisance, nor is it
grounds to take action against this Defendant in addition to the
revocation of the conditional use permit.
8.  In response to paragraph 12 of Plaintiff’s Complaint,
this Defendant specifically admits that the conditional use
permit requires it to regulate activity “by patrons of this
facility.”  This Defendant cannot regulate the activities of
others who are not patrons; and cannot be required to do so.
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9.  This Defendant is without knowledge sufficient to admit
or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, and specifically denies that “allowing” acts on
property which is not exclusively under its control, and which
“annoys” others, or “endangers the comfort or repose” of others
constitutes a nuisance.  None of those things come within the
definition contained in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-801, which
requires danger to “human life or health”. 
10.  This Defendant is without sufficient information on
which to admit or deny that such a meeting occurred; but
affirmatively alleges that any statement made to the effect that
this Defendant “was creating a public nuisance” was in error.
11.  This Defendant responds to paragraph 15 of Plaintiff’s
Complaint as set forth above.
12.  This Defendant admits that complaints have been
received and affidavits signed as alleged in paragraphs 16, 17
and 18 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, but affirmatively alleges either
that it is not responsible for the activities complained of.
13.  This Defendant has insufficient information on which to
admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 19 and 20
of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
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14.  This Defendant has insufficient information on which to
admit or deny the allegations concerning the arrests made in
paragraph 21 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, but specifically alleges
that the conduct for which the arrests occurred do not constitute
“lewdness, as previously stated above.
15.  This Defendant has insufficient information on which to
admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 22, 23, 24,
25 and 26 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  This Defendant specifically
denies that any activities which occur during or around its hours
of operation would affect “children [being] afraid to play
outside of their homes”.
16.  This Defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraphs 28 and 29 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
17.  This Defendant responds to paragraph 30 of Plaintiff’s
Complaint as set forth above.
18.  This Defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraphs 31, 32, an 33 of Plaintiff’s complaint.
19.  This Defendant admits the allegations contained in
paragraphs 34 of Plaintiff’s complaint.
20.  This Defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraphs 35, 36, an 37 of Plaintiff’s complaint, and all
19
allegations not specifically admitted herein.
DATED this _______ day of September, 2008.
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C.
______________________________
W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Defendant   
                                   Salon Tropicana Midvale, Inc.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _______ day of September, 2008,
I did mail a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer,
postage prepaid to H. Craig Hall, Attorney for Plaintiff, 201
South Main Street, Suite 2000, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
___________________________________
__
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   ADDENDUM
B. The Preliminary Injunction
1W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. (2170)
Attorney for Plaintiff
6885 South State Street, Suite 200
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone:  (801) 565-0894
     
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
               
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
                         ---oooOooo---
 :  
SALON TROPICANA MIDVALE,       :    PRELIMINARY INUNCTION
INC.,                          :   
                               :
a Utah corporation,            :     
                               :  
Plaintiff,  :   
 :    Civil No. 080922860          
vs.                            :              
                               :
CITY OF MIDVALE                :    Judge Christiansen
                               :     
 Defendant.
                         ---oooOooo---
     
THIS MATTER came on regularly hearing before Hon. Michele
Christiansen, Judge of the above entitled Court, on the 6  day ofth
November, 2006, pursuant to Plaintiff’s Motion for entry of
Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff was represented by its attorney,
W. Andrew McCullough. Defendant was represented by its attorneys,
H. Craig Hall and Jennifer A. Brown. The Court, having heard
arguments on behalf of the parties, and being fully advised in the
2premises, makes and enters the following ORDER:
1. The parties, in their Oral Arguments, agreed that the
issuance of a Preliminary Injunction in this matter is subject to
the requirement of Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
That Rule governs the issuance of Preliminary Injunctions, pending
a decision on the merits, of litigation before the Court. The test
set forth in Rule 65A contains four (4) parts:
A. Will the Plaintiff suffer irreparable harm, in the
absence of the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction?  The Plaintiff
has presented an Affidavit to the effect that Plaintiff will suffer
irreparable harm if its conditional use permit is revoked. The
Court finds that the Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the
injunction is not granted.
B. Will the threat of injury to Plaintiff outweigh
whatever damage a Preliminary Injunction may cause the Defendant?
The issue here is the loss of business versus the continued
possibility of offensive conduct in the areas around the
Plaintiff’s business.  The injury to the city may exist, but it
does not outweigh the injury to Plaintiff.
C. Is there a substantial likelihood that Plaintiff will
prevail on the merits of its case; or, do Plaintiff’s claims
3present serious issues that should be subject to further
litigation? The Court finds that the issues before it, raised by
Plaintiff, are serious, including the question as to whether the
activities complained of are within the control of Plaintiff.
D. Would the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction be
contrary to the public interest? This Court finds this the most
troubling of the four elements. The ongoing public impact of the
business on the neighbors is of concern to the court. The
establishment has been in business for 5 years; and there have been
no citations or legal actions involving direct wrong doing by the
Plaintiff, which weighs against the claim that the public interest
is adversely affected. 
2. Plaintiff’s application for a Preliminary Injunction
against the revocation of its conditional use permit is, based on
the forgoing, granted. Midvale is hereby preliminarily enjoined
from taking action to enforce the revocation of the conditional use
permit of Plaintiff, based on the allegations before this Court at
this time. This injunction will remain in effect until further
order of the Court, as set forth below.
3. The parties agree that an appeal before this Court of a
revocation of a conditional use permit is a summary proceeding, to
4be determined on the record made before the City. Plaintiff is
therefore granted until December 1, 2008, to file its Memorandum in
support of Summary Judgment in its favor and to reply to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The City will respond by
December 12, and Plaintiff will have an additional ten (10) days to
reply. This matter is set for oral arguments on December 29, 2008
at 2:00 PM.
4.  During the time that this order is effective, Plaintiff
will comply fully with all conditions of the conditional use
permit, including the later agreement for the provision of
security.
5.  This Order shall not become effective until the posting of
a bond by Plaintiff as security for its performance herein, in the
sum of $30,000.  A commercial or property bond shall be sufficient.
DATED this _______ day of November, 2008.
BY THE COURT:     
_____________________________________
Michele Christiansen, Judge
5APPROVED AS TO FORM:
__________________________
H. Craig Hall
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _______ day of November, 2008, I
did mail a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, postage
prepaid to H. Craig Hall, Attorney for Plaintiff, 201 South Main
Street, Suite 2000, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, and also by facsimile
at 533-9595.
_____________________________________
Licenses/salontrop.preliminj.SLCDist
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  ADDENDUM
       E. Notice of Appeal
1W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. (2170)
Attorney for Plaintiff 
6885 South State St., Suite 200
Midvale, UT 84047
Telephone:  (801) 565-0894
   IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
                         ---oooOooo---
SALON TROPICANA MIDVALE,       : 
INC., a Utah corporation,      :   
                               :
Plaintiff                 : NOTICE OF APPEAL
                               :
                               :    
vs.                            :             
                               :
CITY OF MIDVALE,               :
                               :  Civil No: 080922860
Defendant.                :        Judge Christiansen
                     :
                         ---oooOooo---
COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above entitled action and
hereby appeals the Judgment and Order of this Court, signed on
January 14, 2009, to the Utah Court of Appeals. This appeal is from
the entire Judgment and Order of the District Court.  
       DATED this _____ day of January, 2009.     
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C.
___________________________________
W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Plaintiff
2CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _______ day of January, 2009, I
did mail a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal,
postage prepaid to, H., Craig Hall, Attorney for Defendant, 201
South Main St., Suite 2000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
___________________________________
Appeal\salon.trop.noa.2009
